The timely fulfillment of customer orders is a crucial issue for all companies, as it improves the relationship between companies and their customers. Given the negative impact of late deliveries on company profits, companies invest resources in defining and implementing strategies that help address delivery times on time and minimize transportation costs. One of these strategies is the establishment of Regional Distribution Centers (RDCs) in strategic locations, which serve as intermediaries between companies and their consumers. Through a game theoretical model, this article analyzes the strategic interaction between rented and owned RDCs since they have different objectives. In such a case, RDCs’ interaction casts similarities with the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Likewise, we provide empirical evidence about the previous behavior by considering data from a Mexican company.

regional distribution centers, game theoretical model.

Received: February 3, 2023; Accepted: March 28, 2023; Published: July 26, 2023

How to cite this article: Damián Emilio Gibaja-Romero, José Luis Martínez-Flores and Diana Sanchez-Partida, Non-cooperative behavior in interaction of distribution centers, Advances and Applications in Discrete Mathematics 40(1) (2023), 57-85. http://dx.doi.org/10.17654/0974165823057

This Open Access Article is Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

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